Eisenstadt and Makovsky: The Need for Consistent U.S. and Israeli Public Messaging on Iran

[R]egardless of any private understandings the two leaders reach on Monday, Washington should continue to emphasize one idea in public: while the United States and Israel share the same objective regarding Iran and the same preference for a diplomatic solution, Israel ultimately makes its own decisions about its own security. Such an approach would further ratchet up pressure on Tehran, turning the all-too-visible differences in U.S. and Israeli policy over military action into a factor that advances common U.S. and Israeli policy objectives. As Vice President Biden's national security advisor Antony Blinken put it in a speech this week, "Israel has to make its own decisions. We are not in the business of telling our allies and partners what to do when it comes to their own national security."


http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1834

Yadlin: Israel's Last Chance to Strike Iran [before it has to entrust its security to others]

Yadlin is not arguing for an attack on Iran.  He says, however: “What is needed is an ironclad American assurance that if Israel refrains from acting in its own window of opportunity — and all other options have failed to halt Tehran’s nuclear quest — Washington will act [militarily, and with some specificity of action] to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is still within its power to do so.”  //M. Finkelstein   jcrc@dmjfed.org

 

February 29, 2012    New York Times

Israel’s Last Chance to Strike Iran

By AMOS YADLIN

Tel Aviv

ON June 7, 1981, I was one of eight Israeli fighter pilots who bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. As we sat in the briefing room listening to the army chief of staff, Rafael Eitan, before starting our planes’ engines, I recalled a conversation a week earlier when he’d asked us to voice any concerns about our mission.

We told him about the risks we foresaw: running out of fuel, Iraqi retaliation, how a strike could harm our relationship with America, and the limited impact a successful mission might have — perhaps delaying Iraq’s nuclear quest by only a few years. Listening to today’s debates about Iran, we hear the same arguments and face the same difficulties, even though we understand it is not 1981.

Shortly after we destroyed Osirak, the Israeli defense attaché in Washington was called into the Pentagon. He was expecting a rebuke. Instead, he was faced with a single question: How did you do it? The United States military had assumed that the F-16 aircraft they had provided to Israel had neither the range nor the ordnance to attack Iraq successfully. The mistake then, as now, was to underestimate Israel’s military ingenuity.

We had simply maximized fuel efficiency and used experienced pilots, trained specifically for this mission. We ejected our external fuel tanks en route to Iraq and then attacked the reactor with pinpoint accuracy from so close and such a low altitude that our unguided bombs were as accurate and effective as precision-guided munitions.

Today, Israel sees the prospect of a nuclear Iran that calls for our annihilation as an existential threat. An Israeli strike against Iran would be a last resort, if all else failed to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. That moment of decision will occur when Iran is on the verge of shielding its nuclear facilities from a successful attack — what Israel’s leaders have called the “zone of immunity.”

Some experts oppose an attack because they claim that even a successful strike would, at best, delay Iran’s nuclear program for only a short time. But their analysis is faulty. Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years — hence any successful strike would achieve a delay of only a few years.

What matters more is the campaign after the attack. When we were briefed before the Osirak raid, we were told that a successful mission would delay the Iraqi nuclear program for only three to five years. But history told a different story.

After the Osirak attack and the destruction of the Syrian reactor in 2007, the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs were never fully resumed. This could be the outcome in Iran, too, if military action is followed by tough sanctions, stricter international inspections and an embargo on the sale of nuclear components to Tehran. Iran, like Iraq and Syria before it, will have to recognize that the precedent for military action has been set, and can be repeated.

Others claim that an attack on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region. But a nuclear Iran could lead to far worse: a regional nuclear arms race without a red phone to defuse an escalating crisis, Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf, more confident Iranian surrogates like Hezbollah and the threat of nuclear materials’ being transferred to terrorist organizations.

Ensuring that Iran does not go nuclear is the best guarantee for long-term regional stability. A nonnuclear Iran would be infinitely easier to contain than an Iran with nuclear weapons.

President Obama has said America will “use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” Israel takes him at his word.

The problem, however, is one of time. Israel doesn’t have the safety of distance, nor do we have the United States Air Force’s advanced fleet of bombers and fighters. America could carry out an extensive air campaign using stealth technology and huge amounts of ammunition, dropping enormous payloads that are capable of hitting targets and penetrating to depths far beyond what Israel’s arsenal can achieve.

This gives America more time than Israel in determining when the moment of decision has finally been reached. And as that moment draws closer, differing timetables are becoming a source of tension.

On Monday, Mr. Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel are to meet in Washington. Of all their encounters, this could be the most critical. Asking Israel’s leaders to abide by America’s timetable, and hence allowing Israel’s window of opportunity to be closed, is to make Washington a de facto proxy for Israel’s security — a tremendous leap of faith for Israelis faced with a looming Iranian bomb. It doesn’t help when American officials warn Israel against acting without clarifying what America intends to do once its own red lines are crossed.

Mr. Obama will therefore have to shift the Israeli defense establishment’s thinking from a focus on the “zone of immunity” to a “zone of trust.” What is needed is an ironclad American assurance that if Israel refrains from acting in its own window of opportunity — and all other options have failed to halt Tehran’s nuclear quest — Washington will act to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is still within its power to do so.

I hope Mr. Obama will make this clear. If he does not, Israeli leaders may well choose to act while they still can.

Amos Yadlin, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, is the director of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: March 1, 2012

An earlier version of this essay misstated the date of Israel's 1981 air strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. It was June 7, not July 7.

 

 

 

 

Source:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/opinion/israels-last-chance-to-strike-iran.html?_r=1&src=tp

 

Kagan and Zarif: Admit the facts and then debate what to do.

“There is no case to be made that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.”

“ This is not a recommendation for a military strike on the Iranian nuclear program. One could decide that allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities is preferable to the consequences of a military strike, or one could accept at face value President Obama's statements that the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal is unacceptable (which implies a willingness to use military force to prevent it). But the debate must take place on the basis of a reality not skewed to support one or another policy option.”  Kagan and Zarif    

 

 

America's Iranian Self-Deception

Let's admit the facts about its nuclear program and then have an honest debate about what to do.

 

 

By FREDERICK W. KAGAN AND MASEH ZARIF    Wall Street Journal,  Op Ed,  February 27. 2012

Americans are being played for fools by Iran—and fooling themselves. There is no case to be made that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. There is no evidence that Iran's decision-makers are willing to stop the nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions or anything else. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported on Friday that it has made no progress in its negotiations with Iran and that Iran continues to accelerate its enrichment operations, which are in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and agreements with the IAEA.

Yet the policy discussion in the U.S. is confused. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross writes that the Iranians are ready for talks. Anonymous administration officials refer to one of the most dangerous Iranian nuclear installations, Fordow, outside the city of Qom, as "a Potemkin facility." The media are full of comparisons to Iraq in 2003, when suspicions that Iraq was pursuing a covert nuclear program led to war.

People are conflating intelligence assessment with policy recommendation. The prospect of war with Iran is so distasteful that people are desperate to persuade themselves that the problem is not serious.

IAEA inspectors on the ground at Iran's nuclear facilities reported the following facts on Friday: Iran's inventory of centrifuges enriching uranium isotopes has been steadily expanding, along with the stockpiles of uranium enriched to 3.5% and 20%—important stages on the road to weapons-grade uranium. Iran has installed and run advanced centrifuges in the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran has buried an enrichment facility under a small mountain at Fordow, installed air-defense systems around it, and brought new centrifuges online there.

Iran is developing techniques and technologies needed to turn weapons-grade uranium (which it is not yet producing) into an atomic bomb. The IAEA reported that the Iranians "dismissed the Agency's concerns [about weaponization] . . . largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations." The Iranians have denied inspectors access to the facilities that inspectors suspect are being used to work on weaponization.

The price of this refusal, including U.N. and international sanctions, has devastated the Iranian economy. Unemployment and popular dissatisfaction with the regime are high. Unprecedentedly harsh sanctions imposed by the Obama administration are driving off customers for Iran's oil.

What peaceful purpose could be served by accepting such damage to pursue an illegal nuclear program? The international community has repeatedly offered Iran enriched uranium for its reactors to produce both electricity and medical isotopes—and Iran has refused. Iran's behavior makes sense only if its leadership is determined to have a nuclear program that can develop and field atomic weapons.

The pressure on Iran's economy and tensions within its political elite persuade some observers that Iran's leaders are nearing a decision to trade the nuclear program for relaxed sanctions. That may be true—but there is no evidence for it. Iran's leaders continue to insist on Iran's right to the nuclear program as it is being built. No Iranian leader has suggested that Iran should comply with the IAEA or abandon the program.

Western observers are confusing internal Iranian disagreements about how to manage their economic challenges with disagreements about foreign policy. Increasing external pressure this year could fracture the Iranian leadership on this issue, but no one has adduced any convincing evidence that is happening.

Iran is, however, preparing rhetorically for war with the West. Iran's military has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, attack American naval ships passing through it, and pre-empt what it perceives to be preparations for an attack on Iran. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other political figures have seconded these threats, and no Iranian leader has denounced them.

By contrast, there has been no vocal outcry for military action against Iran in the U.S. Even Israel's threats have been muted and confused. The bellicosity in this crisis is coming almost entirely from Tehran. Why should a state seeking a peaceful nuclear program work so hard to whip up war fever?

Some say that Iran's leaders are irrational. But their statements and actions in this instance—juxtaposing bellicosity with offers of negotiations—make perfect sense if they are intended to cover the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

The Iranians are advancing technically as fast as they can to acquire the fuel for a nuclear bomb. They also are pursuing key elements of a weaponization program separately and covertly. At the same time, they have attempted to draw the IAEA inspectors into protracted negotiations that would buy time to reach what the Israelis call the "zone of immunity" after which Israel no longer has a viable military option.

Add it up any way you like: Iran is starting to race to reach a breakout point at which the international community will be unable to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, short of a massive American military strike. The evidence available supports no other conclusion.

This is not a recommendation for a military strike on the Iranian nuclear program. One could decide that allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities is preferable to the consequences of a military strike, or one could accept at face value President Obama's statements that the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal is unacceptable (which implies a willingness to use military force to prevent it). But the debate must take place on the basis of a reality not skewed to support one or another policy option.

Those who oppose military action against Iran under any circumstances must say so, and must accept the consequences of that statement. Those who advocate military action must also accept and consider the consequences—regional and possibly global conflict and all of the associated perils of war. But neither American nor Israeli nor any Western interest is served by lying to ourselves and pretending the predicament will go away.

Mr. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Zarif is research manager at the Critical Threats Project and leads its Iran team. Mr. Zarif's new report on the Iranian nuclear program can be found at http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear-program/zarif-timelines-data-estimates-february-27-2012

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577243510484523048.html

 

 

 

US Congressmen Engel and Nadler explain the significance of having been the target of rock throwing, Friday, on the Mount of Olives. The significance? Another attempt to erase the Jewish presence, to erase the Jewish historical presence from Jerusalem.

Congressmen and Hoenlein Attacked on Mount of Olives

 

 

 

Source: 

 http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/153149#.T0vCBXnO1jy

Benny Morris draws vital distinction between a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran

Benny Morris:   "There is a vital difference between a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran: The Iranian regime is bad. It assaulted and murdered its own people following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's fraudulent reelection in 2009. It supports terrorists beyond its own borders, including against Israel. The regime is also mad; it has threatened Israel's destruction.

But Israel, even when massively attacked by Syrian and Egyptian forces in 1973, has never used nuclear weapons, which it has had for more than 40 years. Israel has never threatened its neighbors with destruction. Though it may have a hawkish right-wing government in power, Israel has always been (and is now) run by rational, sane leaders who would never use nuclear weapons unless faced with apocalyptic circumstances.

Comparing the two countries — a democracy and a totalitarian theocratic dictatorship — is silly and smacks of moral relativism. Visits to the two countries would make this obvious."

source:

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/letters/la-le-postscript-israel-iran-nuclear-20120225,0,6848944.story

Please substitute reading http://facebook.com/JewishCurrentEvents

  for reading J-NewsLine.  The J-Newsline blog is being phased out.   Thank you.

Feb. 15 TIP Conference Call: "Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and What it means for Israel"

 

10 am Central time on Wednesday, Feb. 15.

 "The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and What it means for Israel."

 

 Follow link to register for the conference call.    http://bit.ly/zCqR5D

 

Conference Call with David Pollock-The Israel Project

www.theisraelproject.org

The Israel Project (TIP), an international non-profit organization, provides journalists and leaders accurate information about the Middle East. TIP is not related to any government or government agency

 

Clapper: Iran a threat to U.S. on many fronts

Iran a threat to U.S. on many fronts

By Suzanne Kelly   http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/16/iran-a-threat-to-u-s-on-many-fronts/        February 16, 2012

Iran poses a laundry list of threats to U.S. national security, according to top officials in the intelligence community.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday that Iran poses a threat on a number of fronts, including its ability to develop a nuclear weapon, and the fact that any nuclear attack would likely be delivered by a ballistic missile.

"Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile force, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload," Clapper said during his opening remarks to the committee.

The question for the intelligence community remains whether Iran, in particular Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei, either already has decided or will decide to pull the trigger when it comes to taking the country's nuclear knowledge and applying it to the actual development of a nuclear weapon.

"Iran's technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so," Clapper said.

There are a number of indicators that the intelligence community is looking for that Clapper refused to detail during the public hearing that would indicate that the decision has already been made, and Clapper added that there is no indication yet that the decision has been made.

But Iran is not giving up the potential either. Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said Iran is also "not close to agreeing" to abandon its nuclear program.

Under questioning by Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-New Hampshire, Clapper and Burgess verified that Iran remains a significant threat on a number of fronts, including its continued support of organizations such as Hezbollah, which is deemed a terrorist organization by the United States, as well as its indirect support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Burgess added that Iranian weapons have been found in Afghanistan, and that Tehran is attempting a "dual-track strategy" in Afghanistan and Iraq - working against U.S. and coalition desires while making efforts to "put forward the government" in both countries.

"They are walking both sides of the fence" said Burgess, who confirmed that it is the intelligence communities' belief that Iran is supporting the killing of U.S. soldiers.

"Iran is a big problem," Clapper added. He said recent bombing attempts in Thailand, India and Georgia targeting Israeli interests may not have been a technical success, but they still had a psychological impact.

Iran also poses a threat to U.S. interests and can close the Strait of Hormuz, the entryway to the Persian Gulf, at least temporarily, Burgess said. While Iran has substantial reach with its ballistic missiles, it would likely only use them if provoked, according to the U.S. intelligence assessment.

"Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict," Burgess said.

Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, who co-chairs the committee, listed his own ideas about the Iranian threat during his remarks to open the hearing, noting that Iran's believed involvement in a recent plot to assassinate a Saudi ambassador on U.S. soil has changed the nature of the threat.

"The rulers in Iran clearly pose a more direct threat to us than many would have assumed just a year ago," McCain said. "And that is on top of the hostile actions in which Iran has been engaging for years, including killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting terrorist groups across the Middle East, destabilizing Arab countries, propping up and rearming the Assad regime in Syria, and continuing their undeterred pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.  The threat posed by the Iranian regime could soon bring the Middle East to the brink of war, if it has not already."